Tommaso Maria Zigliara (1873).51 Zigliara (1833-1893) was a Italian Neo-Scholastic philosopher and theologian,
who became a cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church. He was one of the founders of the Neo-Scholastic movement, superintendent
of the critical edition of St. Thomas Aquinas works entitled The Leonine Edition, author of a text Summa Philosophica that
had world circulation, and co-president of the Pontifical Academy of St. Aquinas. By his teaching and through his writings,
he was one of the chief promoters, under Pope Leo XIII, of reviving and promoting Thomistic philosophy and theology throughout
the entire Church. In his own Dominican Order and in some seminaries and universities, the teaching of St. Thomas had never
been interrupted, but it was Zigliara who gave a special impetus to the movement that made Thomistic philosophy and theology
dominant in the Catholic world.
Zigliara was born in Bonifacio, Corsica, in 1833 and died in Rome in 1893. He did his classical studies in Bonifacio under
Rev. Aloysius Piras, S.J. At eighteen years of age, he joined the Dominican Order in Rome, and was professed in 1852. He was
always a brilliant student. He studied philosophy in Rome and theology in Perugia. In 1856, Zigliara was ordained to the priesthood
by Joachim Cardinal Pecci, Archbishop of Perugia. Appointments to teach philosophy at Rome, at Corbara in Corsica, and at
Viterbo quickly followed. Back in Rome, he became the regent (head professor) of the Minerva College. When Pope Leo XIII was
elected, Zigliara was made a cardinal, and appointed prefect of the Congregation of Studies, which regulated the courses in
all the seminaries in the world. Zigliara’s Summa Philosophica was the textbook of seminaries in Europe, Canada, and
the United States for many years. Around 1920, this book was so influential that it was the textbook for the philosophical
examination in the National University of Ireland.
Caesare Carbone (1935).52 Carbone was an Italian Neo-Scholastic philosopher and priest who taught in the regional
Catholic seminary in Apulia, Italy. He wrote his books in Latin, and his concern was for his seminary students. His purpose,
which was to provide extensive material in two volumes for scholastic disputation, was unique among the Neo-Scholastic philosophers
of the twentieth century. In the tradition of the public Questiones Disputatae of the Middle Ages, every seminary in
the early nineteenth century had a solemn disputation at least once a year in Latin concerning some philosophic topic to help
students actually see a living scholastic debate; and such a process was even more useful since it was a preparation for the
eventual Latin oral defense of doctoral dissertations.
Carbone treated some important preliminary issues for this dissertation. First, he opposes ideology, by noting that neither
divine revelation, nor human assertion can be the only first criterion of truth. Against this, we have already seen that Nogar
argues to the fact of evolution by the consensus of scientists. Second, Carbone also notes that sciences are distinguished
by the way in which the same object is known, so this forms a basis of understanding that both philosophy and empirical science
can treat evolution, but each in its own way. Third, Carbone notes that science is defined as the effect of demonstration,
and yields knowledge of a thing that is certain and evident due to the necessity of its causes. Of course, this definition
of science is based on the deductive power of the Aristotelian syllogism, rather than the inductive process of modern empirical
science. Such a definition favoring deduction then opened the debate in the twentieth century as to whether philosophy and
science are essentially different (Maritain) or not (Mondin).
Carbone treats issues in evolution, although he does not treat evolution directly. First, he treats the problem of knowing
the substance’s essence, which cannot be known simply by the accumulation of visible and material qualities alone, but
by the intellect. This raises the question even for the philosopher, no less for the empirical scientist, of how to determine
if evolution has occurred to change one species to another species. Second, Carbone treats the distinction between substance
and accidents, which lead to the question of how small changes can result in a substantial change that can be termed evolution
of a species. Third, Carbone argues to the existence of a final cause, which Darwinism denies in espousing natural selection.
Fourth, Carbone argues to the mutual causality of matter and form, following the hylemorphic theory of Aristotle, which will
help to philosophically understand the mechanism of evolution.
Ioannes Di Napoli (1958).53 Di Napoli was an Italian Neo-Scholastic philosopher and a priest who is a seminary
professor. His four volume Manuale Philosophiae is intended as a Latin class text. His books have ecclesiastical approval.
Di Napoli has a well-argued approach to evolution. He is very clear, and up-to-date for his time.
Di Napoli treats evolutionary topics. He rejects abiogenesis. He is against Darwinism, which maintains evolution of both
the body and the soul. He rejects evolutionary Mechanicism. He affirms the need for formal causality, against mere natural
selection by chance. He affirms the essential difference between man and the other animals. He treats human speech extensively.
He affirms the need for creation of the soul by God. For man, Di Napoli affirms free will. He also treats the future of man
by affirming the immortality of the soul. He is a theist.
Di Napoli holds that Spiritualistic Evolutionism is possible and even probable. He is careful to note that evolution is
not a scientifically proven fact. Di Napoli rejects Darwinism (evolution of both body and soul), which is Materialistic Evolutionism.
Di Napoli notes that the evolution of the body is not impossible. He makes a clear distinction between bodily evolution (which
involves change or becoming, whose Latin term is fieri), and the spiritual soul’s creation (which gives it not
just essence but existence, whose Latin term is esse). He rejects crass notions that the body of the monkey and man
are the same, arguing psychological and physiological differences. He notes that many still defend Creationism and Fixism,
and these positions are still able to be sustained; but the latest fossil evidence creates serious difficulties for these
theories. Therefore, as possible, Di Napoli defends Spiritualistic Evolutionism, which holds that the soul was created by
God, but the body had an evolutionary origin. Di Napoli distinguishes this Spiritualistic Evolutionism to be of two kinds.
Some hold that the body of man had its de facto origin from a simian body without a special divine intervention. This
opinion is held by Mivart, Le Roy, and Teilhard de Chardin. Di Napoli rejects this type of Spiritualistic Evolutionism. Some
hold that the body of man had an evolutionary origin with special divine intervention, in so far as God previously
transformed a simian body into the human body and then infused in this human body a created soul. Catholics who hold this
doctrine are D’Hulst, De Sinety, Bouyssonie, Wasmann, Gemelli, and Marcozzi. This second opinion of Spiritualist Evolutionism
with special divine intervention is the position defended by Di Napoli.
Di Napoli sums up his position by affirming that Spiritualist Evolutionism as philosophically not impossible. This theory
would be impossible, if the following would be admitted: eternity of material, abiogenesis, identity between monkey (animal)
and man, merely mechanical transformation without any finality, and without divine intervention. But Spiritualistic Evolutionism
with special divine intervention does not admit any of these things. Therefore, the philosophical hypothesis of Spiritualistic
Evolutionism with divine intervention is not impossible. However, if Creationism and Fixism are shown to be less likely, then
this kind of Spiritualistic Evolutionism with divine intervention would be possible and even probable. Nevertheless, for Spiritualistic
Evolutionism even with divine intervention to be a true scientific doctrine, there would still be required more valid biological
Joseph Gevaert (1992).54 Gevaert is an Italian Neo-Scholastic who has written a serious study in philosophical
Gevaert’s book on The Problem of Man (Il Problema dell’Uomo) is a good example of the new Neo-Scholasticism.
There is no ecclesiastical approval, although the book is in a series of theology books. There is no thesis form, but rather
expansions of general topics of philosophic interest in the philosophy of man. The book is directed to the college student
or the educated general reader. Unfortunately, for students there is no index, but rather a seven page table of contents.
The footnotes are all fairly current, and in Italian, English, Spanish, German, and French, with generous citations of original
texts. The popularity of the book is clear, since it has gone through eight editions.
Gevaert has a Neo-Scholastic point of view concerning liberty, immortality, and God. He treats the non-scholastic modern
philosophers extensively: Kant, Jaspers, Heidegger, Marcel, Sartre, Camus, Marcuse, Simone de Beauvoir, and Feuerbach. He
does cite the scholastic tradition, for example, Rahner, Maritain, Boros, Tresmontant, Delooz, and Teilhard de Chardin. He
does not deal directly with St. Thomas Aquinas, who is mentioned in a footnote, but not directly in the bibliography. Gevaert
is also an expert on the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas.
Gevaert is important in facing the question of human existence in the world. He does this from a Christian point of view.
He opens his treatment of man from a social point of view. He decries the loss of this social aspect of man from the time
of Cartesian Rationalism, through post-Kantian Idealism, to Collectivism. He promotes the ethical and metaphysical primacy
of "the other." He wants being with other to also include being for others.
Gevaert treats the body of man in a philosophic and creative way. He does not do this in an evolutionary way. His adversary
is the Dualism of Descartes, Malebranche and Leibniz. He finds the significance of the human body as the place of human actuation,
as language, as principle of instrumentality, as a limit, and as the point of orientation toward others. He is concerned with
Gevert treats the soul of man. When Darwin published The Origin of Species, it was quickly interpreted by some philosophers
(Haeckel, Nietzsche, Marx, Engels) in a way that moved from anthropology to just material science. But there is more to the
world of man than just material, as proved by society, culture, and history. Man is a spirit as much as a body.
Gevaert then seems to continue his treatment of man (part two of his book) in the more traditional order of scholastic
psychology. First, he treats the intellect. Secondly, he treats the will, with an emphasis on freedom. However, he then creatively
adds a chapter on the historicity of man, and another on the final goal of man. The treatment of this final goal involves
the immortality of the soul and the promise of being with God.
Gevaert is useful for this dissertation in his opposition to Materialism, his view of the dignity of the body, his free
will in society, his future of man’s immortal soul, and God as the final promise. Gevaert notes that the love of the
Creator God is the eternal guarantee of the gift of personal existence. Accordingly, Gavaert uses creation in a creative way
and is more interested about the present and future of man, than about man’s origins.
Fiorenzo Facchini (1993).55 Facchini is an Italian Neo-Scholastic who is the ordinary professor of anthropology
at the University of Bologna. He also teaches paleontology in the School of Archeology at the University of Bologna. Facchini
is an evolutionist and a theist. Facchini treats evolution both as a scientist and as a philosopher. His presentations touch
issues of the human evolutionary past and future.
Facchini notes that evolution is a problem. The debate over what set off evolution and shaped it is still open. It is not
easy to determine when man appeared in the history of life, and so hypotheses are founded on when, where and how man arose.
It is important to know the criteria behind the hypothesis. He notes that Darwinist scientists have a tendency to ideology.
Facchini notes that solutions to the problem of the evolution of man must be faced biologically, culturally, and philosophically.
Certain physical conditions were necessary for the emergence of man: a fit environment, brain development for cerebral areas
connected to language, ability to stand erect and bipedalism. Certain cultural or comportmental criteria had to be fulfilled
to show the capacity for culture: tools actually fashioned, territorial and social organization, religion, planning, and symbolization
to indicate capacity for language.
Facchini believes in the evolution of the body of man. Six million years ago there was a divergence in the lineage of the
anthropomorphic apes and the cluster of Hominid species. Two million years ago, the human lineage emerged. Homo habilis
evolved to Homo erectus, to which Homo sapiens is related. 150,000 years ago, modern man developed.
Facchini notes the discontinuity between biological evolution and culture. There is an ontological difference between man
and the other animals. Man expresses himself in culture. Facchini underlines that culture constitutes an "anomaly" in the
evolutionary process because it permits man to adapt himself to different environments and so to occupy the whole earth. By
culture, man always appears more in contrast to natural selection, and it is man who now largely directs the process of biological
evolution. The emergence of man implies and essentially recognizable discontinuity in culture, which reveals itself on the
empirical level in the specific behavior of man.
Facchini notes a spiritual principle in man, observable from culture. The behavior of man, creator of culture is self-conscious
and free, capable of self determination. This reveals the metabiological nature of the human species. The genetic base, which
does influence human behavior, does not normally appear so determining as to suppress free will. Just when man first received
a spiritual soul is impossible to say, since the soul itself is outside empirical observation. However, it does not seem reasonable
that the soul emerged gradually. Human psychology enters the spiritual sphere at once or not at all. There is no gradual development
of the human psyche, but the presence or absence of abstractive intelligence or self-consciousness. While the soul of man
is not the object of direct empirical science, the soul leaves traces in its cultural productions that are signs of the specific
activity of man, and these signs are observable by science.
Facchini is not in favor of the Intelligent Design Theory. First, despite the shortcomings of the Darwin’s model
(science), it is a methodological fallacy to look for another model (theological) outside the realm of science, while pretending
to do science. Secondly, Intelligent Design Theory introduces an external and corrective greater cause (God) to explain what
still may be discovered by science working on genetic mutations and the environment. Thirdly, Intelligent Design Theory cannot
explain why catastrophic events and mutations were not avoided.
Pasquale Giustiniani (2000).56 Giustiniani is an Italian Neo-Scholastic philosopher. He was born in 1951. He
is philosophy professor in the "St. Thomas Aquinas Section" of the Pontifical Faculty of Theology of South Italy, in Naples.
He writes in the Italian language, not Latin. He has published two books and various magazine articles. He has submitted an
article to an International Congress.
Giustinini wrote a book on philosophic anthropology. He treats new questions in anthropology, but notes the difference
between empirical anthropology and true philosophical anthropology. He treats the problem of man in the twentieth century,
and the consequences of a philosophical anthropology. He is very conscious of the modern philosophical trends and their founders:
the personalistic anthropology of Max Scheler (1874-1928), the Neo-Kanatian anthropology and ontology of Nicolai Hartmann
(1882-1950), the Dualism of Descartes (1596-1650), the Existentialism of Karl Jaspers (1883-1969), the Neo-Hebreism of Martin
Buber (1878-1965), the Personalism of Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973), and the founders of today’s philosophical anthropology,
Arnold Gehlen and Helmut Plessner. On the side of traditional scholasticism, Giustiniani affirms Hylemorphism, the immortality
of the soul of man, and the unity of body and soul which makes up the total person. Giustiniani cites Aquinas on the spiritual
soul created directly by God, the subtantiality of the soul, and the profound unity of body and soul. Very helpful is his
fifteen pages of "Reasoned Bibliography," and his frequent footnotes which cite sources in Italian. For a 168 page book, he
has a very full six page table of contents, but no index. Giustiniani cites Joseph De Finance and Giovanni Mondin as some
of his Neo-Scholastic sources.
Giustiniani treats evolution. He explains the hypothesis of Charles Darwin (1809-1882) and the development of this into
a general doctrine by Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919) and the promoters of Positivism in Europe. Giustiniani perceives this Materialism
will cause difficulties for traditional Neo-Scholastic theoretical positions such as: from less cannot come more; the effect
cannot be greater than the cause; the soul cannot come from material. Darwinism continues to be a dogma in scientific circles
even now. The Synthetic Theory of evolution was elaborated by Huxley. Theodosius Dobzhansky explained how higher species can
be an effect of differentiation and isolation of higher animals. George Gaylord Simpson elaborated the theory of Quantative
Evolution in the 1940s. The theory of Punctuated Equilibrium was proposed by Stephen Jay Gould of Harvard and Niles Eldrege.
There are other critics of Darwin, including the Biblical Fundamentalists and the Creationists. There are also casuistic or
tentative theses such as the work of Teilhard de Chardin, or the work of Xavier Zubiri, who places Evolutionism (nuturing
nature) into the context of traditional metaphysics. Giustiniani stresses the need to safeguard four important points. First,
the soul is not reducible to pure materiality. Second, Giustiniani affirms that the passage from pre-man to hominids to modern
man is not an evolution of the species within a single human genus, but man is a unique species. Third, even if an apparent
evolutionary chain of psychic development is discovered, this is not a step in physico-mechanical evolution, but the indication
of an essential change caused by a principle (the soul) ontologically diverse from matter. Fourth, should evidence demand
some acceptance of evolution, this demand would involve divine intervention.
Pedro Barrajón (2005).57 Pedro Barrajón
is an Italian resident and a Neo-Scholastic. He has a Catholic perspective, for he quotes Pope John Paul II favorably. He
is a philosopher, for his interest is in epistemology, by concern for philosophic values and concern for philosophic distinction.
By concern for values, Barrajón wants to know the philosophic value of any theory of scientific
importance. By concern for philosophic distinction, Barrajón wants to distinguish the
grades of knowledge implicit in considering evolution. He writes in Italian. He favors Evolutionism against Fixism. He also
cites as one of his sources, Selvaggi at the Gregorian University.
Barrajón participated in the International Congress on Evolution between 23 and 24
April 2002 at the Pontifical Atheneum Regina Apostolorum, in Rome. His paper on evolution developed two topics. First
is the value of Evolutionism as related to science, philosophy and theology. A scientific theory of evolution must be open
and integrated in a global vision of reality. Philosophy gives such a vision on the rational level. If Revelation is accepted,
theology can add insights. Secondly, the essential difference between man and other animals is due to the spiritual soul of
man created directly by God. Such a soul cannot evolve from infrahuman animals. If evolution happens, the soul is directly
created and infused by God when the evolutionary mechanism has prepared a body adapted to receive it. Science alone is not
able to detect the divine intervention, nor can science alone detect the spiritual soul.
Barrajón treats evolution explicitly. As to method, Barrajón
advocated dialogue in exploring the theory of evolution. Nevertheless, Barrajón is clearly
Catholic in quoting Pope John Paul II, who maintains that man is both body and spirit, and who maintains the essential difference
between man and beast. In epistemology, Barrajón wants to both link and separate science,
philosophy and theology; and Barrajón rejects Scientism, the ideology that science always
knows best. In ontology, Barrajón affirms the unity of man but the duality of body and
soul; he affirms the immediate creation of the soul by God; he affirms that God creates the human person; and he notes that
the paradox of man (noted in the Second Vatican Council document on the Church in the modern world: Gaudium et Spes,
22) deepens the understanding of Christian anthropology.
Barrajón has four conclusions with regard to evolution. First, evolution has great
value to help to know the physical world, but it is not the only theory. Second, evolution does not have absolute value, for
Popper says it is subject to falsification. Third, the ideology of Scientism presents evolution as a philosophy to give the
theory greater validity. Fourth, some scientists today use evolution to promote atheism.
Fernando Pascual (2005).58 Fernando Pascual is an Italian Neo-Scholastic who participated in the international
conference on evolution between 23 and 24 April 2002 in Rome at the Pontifical Atheneum Regina Apostolorum where he
gave a paper in Italian and participated in the dialogue. Fernando Pascual notes that bioethics is the science that regulates
man in regard to human and non-human life. So bioethics must consider the meaning of human beings, the meaning of life in
its various forms, how life is formed and transmitted, and the place that man has among the living creatures. In bioethics,
evolution can either be a foundational thought, or evolution can be a point of reference.
Fernando Pascual critiques the bioethics of Hugo Tristam Englehardt Jr., who is professor of philosophy at Rice University
in Houston, Texas. Englehardt maintains that an ethics cannot be formed as long as there are two roads, rational and religious.
Fernando Pascual disputes Englehardt’s rejection of religion, and objects to the following four theses of Englehardt.
First, Englehardt maintains that human nature is a product of chance. Second, Englehardt maintains that there is no ultimate
reality to follow. Third, Englehardt maintains evolution does not look to the fulfillment of the individual nor society. Fourth,
Englehardt maintains that we can only look to ourselves for a point of moral reference. Fernando Pascual disputes all these
Vittorio Possenti (2005).59 Possenti is an Italian Neo-Scholastic who participated in the international conference
on evolution between 23 and 24 April 2002 in Rome at the Pontifical Atheneum Regina Apostolorum where he gave a paper
in Italian and participated in the dialogue.
Possenti presented a paper on life, nature and teleology. He is persuaded of the necessity to develop an adequate philosophy
of life to the level of contemporary biological discovery. This will allow dialogue between science, philosophy, and theology.
Possenti wants philosophy to deepen two concepts: nature, which is the internal principle of movement, and life, which is
the principle of self-movement. In the light of this, Possenti wants to meditate on two problems: finality, and the search
for a Thomistic principle which can be the foundation for a philosophy of the evolution of life.
Possenti treats finality, following Aristotle and Aquinas, as an ample and analogous notion applicable to ontogenesis and
to phylogenesis, since it is not restricted to conscious subjects. Nature is self-activity finalized. Also, a non-deliberate
goal or a non-intentional goal is a real goal, says Possenti.
Possenti endorses Hylemorphism. He seeks for a philosophical foundation and explanation of evolution in Aquinas, with his
concepts of nature, organism, mutation, substantial transformation, and cause. In particular, the concept of Hylemorphism
is viewed as useful by Possenti. In particular, Possenti notes a difficult but helpful passage in St. Thomas on phylogenesis
(Aquinas Summa Contra Gentiles 3. 22). Phylogenesis, the transformation from species to species, seems possible in
the ontological Hylemorphism of Aquinas, where the potentiality of prime matter is successively and progressively actuated,
and where in the prime matter there is a metaphysical tendency toward diverse forms. This evolutionary tendency, if the fact
of evolution can be demonstrated with sufficient empirical proof, is able to offer an ontological picture capable of giving
a philosophical account of the evolution of life. The hylemorphic explanation would obviate the opposition of creation and
evolution, according to Possenti.
Piero Viotto (2005).60 Viotto is an Italian Neo-Scholastic who participated in the International Conference
on Evolution between 23 and 24 April 2002 in Rome at the Pontifical Atheneum Regina Apostolorum where he gave a paper
in Italian and participated in the dialogue. Viotto writes in Italian. Viotto notes that Maritain explored all of philosophy
in his works, but Viotto only considers Maritain’s views on the biological growth of the human person. Viotto adds a
historical dimension to metaphysical principles.
Viotto notes that Maritain confronted the problem of evolution, both cosmological and biological, during his whole life.
After his graduation from the Sorbonne, Maritain studied embryology with Hans Driesch in Heidelberg. Driesch was conducting
experiments that revealed the inadequacy of Darwinsim and Materialism in evolution. He started with an analysis of Bergson’s
evolutionary views, and attempted to restore the critical realism of St. Thomas for the evaluation of scientific doctrine.
Maritain learned from Bergson that Evolutionism did not have to exclude finalism. Then, Maritain was able to overcome the
implicit immanentism of evolution by finding in St. Thomas an ontology of transcendence. Maritain was then able to conclude,
since each spiritual and rational soul is created by God, that man is born in evolution, but not of evolution. Later in life,
Maritain was to deal with evolution again, considering the theory of Teilhard de Chardin.
CONCLUSION: The conclusion for the Italian Neo-Scholastic philosophers brings to light a number of similar views concerning
Evolutionism. First, there is a concern about communicating views about evolution, since almost everyone is in education:
Carbone, Gevaert, Di Napoli, Facchini, Barrajón, and Giustiniani. Barrajón is especially clear about the need to dialogue and the triple relation
of evolution to science, philosophy, and theology. Possenti endorses the need for dialogue. Secondly, some clearly have moved
to modern questions and presentations in the vernacular: Gevaert, Facchini, Giustiani and Fernando Pascual. Such presentations
are easier to read than the old scholastic texts, but may not be as clear. Thirdly, the authors of the traditional texts are
not without problems, such as the limitation of science to syllogistic demonstration by Carbone. Nevertheless, Neo-Scholastics
like Possenti still look to Aquinas for metaphysical principles to form a foundation for the philosophy of the evolution of
life. Fourth, several Italian Neo-Scholastics affirm Evolutionism, such as Di Napoli who argues Spiritualistic Evolutionism
is not impossible, or Facchini who notes a posteriori proofs for evolution involve both the right external conditions and
evidence of culture. In fact, Di Napoli states that should the fossil record diminish the credibility of Creationism of species,
or diminish Fixism, then Evolutionism would be probable. Barrajón favors Evolutionism.
Fifth, some systems of evolution are rejected, such as Darwinism by Di Napoli, Mechanicism by Di Napoli, Fixism by Barrajón, and Materialism by Gevaert, Giustiniani, and Viotto, and Antifinalism by Carbone, Di Napoli,
Possenti and Fernando Pascual. Sixth, Hylemorphism was a recommended theory by Carbone, Giustiniani, Viotto, and Possenti.
Seventh, the essential difference between man and other animals was affirmed by Di Napoli (due to psychology, physiology and
language), by Facchini, Giustiniani, and Barrajón. Eighth, the possibility of the evolution
of the body of man was affirmed by Facchini (under favorable conditions) and Giustiniani. Facchini noted that Pope Pius XII
noted that evolution of the body of man was possible. Ninth, the spiritual soul of man was created by God according to Di
Napoli, Barrajón, Giustiniani, and Viotto. Tenth, the future of man is not just in the
material world, but involves man’s immortal soul, says Di Napoli, Gevaert, and Giustiniani. Facchini also looks to the
future of man as a development of culture. Eleventh, abiogenesis is denied by Di Napoli. Twelfth, man in society has free
will, according to Di Napoli, Gevaert, and Giustiniani. Thirteenth, the need for God is affirmed by Di Napoli, Gevaert, Facchini,
and Giustiniani. Barrajón asserts that some scientists use evolution to promote atheism.
Fourteenth, Facchini argues against the Intelligent Design Theory, as ideological theology, as external and corrective, and
unable to answer extinction. Carbone also argues agains ideology. Giustiani argues against the Biblical Fundamentalism and
ideological Creationism. Barrajón argues against Scientism. Fifteenth, the eternity of
the world was denied by Di Napoli. Sixteenth, Carbone rises metaphysical problems relevant to evolution, such as the inability
to actually see essences, and the relation of accident to substantial change.